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As the financial crisis has spread through the world, its im-
pacts on poverty and income distribution in developing
countries have proved difficult to track because real-time
data are lacking. Measuring the poverty and distributional
impacts of the crisis is important not only for designing ap-
propriate policy responses, but also for informing policies to
protect poor people in the event of future economic shocks.
Given that household data needed to measure impacts in real
time are not available in most countries, ex ante methods that
extrapolate impacts from pre-crisis data are useful tools.
We build on the model described in Bourguignon, Bus-
solo, and Pereira da Silva (2008) and in Ferreira et al. (2008)
to simulate the impacts of the crisis in several countries. (See
box 1 for details on the methodology.) For this purpose, we
make comparisons between scenarios with and without crisis
for the same year, or in pre- and post-crisis years. Results for
Bangladesh, Mexico, and the Philippines are summarized in
this note.
Aggregate Poverty and Inequality Impacts
The model predicts some increases in the level and depth
of poverty as a result of the crisis in all three countries, with
the extent of increase largely depending on the size of the
macroeconomic impact in the country.1 In Bangladesh and
the Philippines, the crisis has led to a slowdown in GDP
growth, which is expected to raise the poverty rate in 2010
by 1.2 and 1.5 percentage points, respectively, compared
with what would have occurred without the crisis. The lower
rate of poverty reduction resulting from the crisis translates
to approximately 1.4 and 2.0 million additional poor people
in the Philippines and Bangladesh, respectively, in 2010. In
Mexico, GDP actually contracted by nearly 7 percent in
2009, and it is projected to grow by only 3 percent in 2010.
The cumulative impact is projected to raise the poverty rate
by nearly 4 percentage points in Mexico between 2008 and
2010.
As the financial crisis has spread through the world, the lack of real-time data has made it difficult to track its
impact in developing countries. We use a microsimulation approach to assess the poverty and distributional effects of
the crisis. In Bangladesh, Mexico, and the Philippines, we find increases in both the level and the depth of aggregate
poverty. Income shocks are relatively large in the middle (and, in Mexico, the bottom) parts of the income
distribution. We also find that characteristics of people who become poor because of the crisis are different from those
of both chronically poor people and the general population. Our findings will be useful for policy makers wishing to
identify leading monitoring indicators to track the impact of macroeconomic shocks and to design policies that
protect vulnerable groups.In contrast, the crisis has no significant impact on aggre-
gate inequality indexes in any of the three countries. The ag-
gregate  numbers,  however,  mask  larger  changes  in  the
underlying distribution of income and consumption. Some
regions and income groups within each country suffer more
losses than others, depending on which sectors and income
sources are more likely to be affected in the country. 
Distributional Impacts: Who Is Affected 
and How
In all three countries, the impacts are relatively large in the
middle (and, in Mexico, the bottom) parts  of the income
distribution.2 Between 15 and 20 percent of households in
the fourth to seventh deciles of the income distribution in
Mexico and the Philippines suffer per capita income losses
that push them to a lower income decile.3 This number is
10 percent in the case of Bangladesh. In Mexico, where the
crisis has been more severe, significant impacts are also likely
among those at the bottom of the distribution. The poorest
20 percent of Mexican households suffers an average loss in
per capita income of about 8 percent, compared with 5 per-
cent for the entire population—even after existing safety-
net transfers that benefit many of the extremely poor people
are taken into account. 
Impacts on the middle of the distribution can be attrib-
uted to significant employment shocks to urban areas and
particularly the manufacturing and export sectors that em-
ploy a large number of workers in middle-income house-
holds. Urban households suffer more losses, on average, than
do rural households in all countries because the manufactur-
ing sector that bears the brunt of the losses in employment
and labor earnings typically is concentrated in urban areas.
The urban-rural gap is widest in the Philippines (with a 6
percent decline in the per capita income of urban house-
holds, compared with a 3 percent decline for rural house-
holds). In contrast, impacts among the poor and those in rural
areas are more closely associated with lower (international)
remittance flows and a decline in agricultural income.
The significant changes predicted for the middle of the
distribution do not lead to higher inequality in Bangladesh
and the Philippines, as measured by aggregate indexes such
as the Gini coefficient. This is because overall inequality
worsens only when the losses are disproportionately high
among the poor. Only in Mexico, where a larger shock is
projected at the lower end of the distribution, is there a pro-
jected increase in aggregate inequality. 
Beyond these common patterns, there is considerable
variation in how impacts are distributed within countries
because the relative importance of different transmission
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Box 1. Methodological Approach and Caveats
To estimate how macroeconomic impacts would translate into
lower incomes for households, we use a microsimulation approach
that superimposes macroeconomic projections on behavioral mod-
els built on pre-crisis household data. The macroeconomic shocks
are transmitted to households through the labor market in the form
of loss of (or cross-sectoral shifts in) employment and labor earn-
ings, and loss of nonlabor income (including remittances from mi-
grants). The model is loosely based on the approaches described
in Bourginon, Bussolo, and Pereira da Silva (2008) and Ferreira
et al. (2008), but simplified in the sense that it is not linked to a
general equilibrium model that is not readily available for most
developing countries. Instead, the simplified model takes the
macroeconomic projections for a specific country and year as
given, and extrapolates the microeconomic snapshot of future im-
pacts from these projections. 
To measure impacts of the crisis, comparisons are made either
between scenarios with and without crisis for the same year, or
between pre-crisis and post-crisis years. Beyond impacts on
poverty measures, the results also shed light on how the impacts
are distributed among sectors, regions, and income groups; and
what are the characteristics of those who would become poor as
a result of the crisis. We have applied this method to Bang  la  -
desh, Mexico, and the Philippines;  and similar exercises are on-
going for Egypt, Mongolia, and Poland. We find that the crisis
has had important impacts on poverty levels and depth and on
income distribution.
A number of caveats apply to these exercises. First, the countries
studied may not be representative of the global impact. Specif-
ically, because the model focuses on labor income and interna-
tional remittances as transmission channels of impact, it may
not fully capture impacts in countries that are heavily dependent
on commodity exports (for example, some African countries) or
those where wealth shocks play a large role (for example, some
countries in Eastern Europe). However, we do find that results
from other simulation exercises, such as for Latvia, are in line
with the ones presented here.
Second, the fact that the microsimulations are based on past
data that reflect the preexisting structure of labor markets and
household incomes necessarily implies that these structural re-
lationships are assumed to remain constant over the time period
for which the projections are made.channels of impact varies from country to country. Approx-
imately 90 percent of the average loss in per capita house-
hold income in Mexico and the Philippines results from a
fall in labor income, compared with 50 percent of the aver-
age loss in Bangladesh (where losses in remittances are
equally important) (figure 1a). Losses resulting from lower
remittances tend to be more concentrated among better-off
households within urban and rural areas than losses in labor
income, mainly because the initial (pre-crisis) distribution
of remittances was skewed toward the better-off households
at the beginning. 
The combination of these factors generates distributional
patterns that are different across urban and rural areas in dif-
ferent countries. The Philippines is characterized by a high
level of urbanization and a concentration of manufacturing
and service sectors in urban areas, along with a relatively lim-
ited role for remittances (figure 2). These translate into
much larger income losses for urban areas, compared with
rural areas, but a relatively equitable distribution of losses
within each  area.  In  contrast,  significant  distributional
changes within urban and rural areas of Bangladesh and
Mexico are predicted, but with important differences (figure
2). In Bangladesh, relatively better-off households suffer the
greatest losses, mainly because of lower remittances resulting











Note: For Mexico, the change is from pre-crisis to post-crisis (2008 to
2010). 
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Figure 2. Growth Incidence Curves: Percent Change in per Capita
Income/Consumption between No-Crisis and With-Crisis Scenarios
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Note: For Mexico, the change is from pre-crisis to post-crisis (2008 to
2010); for the other countries, the change is from no-crisis to with-crisis
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c. Philippines
urban ruralfrom the crisis—with the largest losses predicted for the top
40 percent of the urban and rural areas alike. In Mexico, the
losses are high among the poor because of a substantial pro-
jected fall in labor income. 
The “Crisis Vulnerable”: A New Challenge
To understand who are affected most by the crisis, it is useful
to examine the characteristics of households that are pro-
jected to be poor as a result of the crisis, but who otherwise
would  not  have  been  poor. These  “crisis-vulnerable”  or
“newly poor” households are quite different from chronically
poor households and from the general population. On aver-
age, the newly poor appear to be more skilled and urban
than the chronically poor, but less so than the general pop-
ulation. They also are more likely to be economically active
than the chronically poor, indicating that the crisis would
have had a sizable effect on the number of “working poor.” 
As shown for all three countries in figure 1.b, newly poor
households suffer much larger income losses (25–50 per-
cent) than average households (3–5 percent). The sources
of these income losses are significant: in Bangladesh, a loss
in remittances appears to be a good leading indicator of
poverty; in Mexico and the Philippines, “new” poverty is
driven almost entirely by losses in labor income (figure 1b).
Relevance for Policy
The results have a number of potential uses for policy design
and monitoring. First, they help identify a list of possible
“leading indicators” that can be monitored rapidly to gauge
the likely welfare impacts of a crisis, in the absence of real-
time information on household income/consumption. Al-
though the appropriate choice of indicators would depend
on the main transmission channels in a specific country,
manufacturing employment, wages, remittance flows, and
relative food prices emerge as potential candidates for mon-
itoring in all three countries. Second, the identification of
the people likely to suffer the most losses can inform the de-
sign of policy responses. In this context, the fact that the
newly poor and the chronically poor differ significantly in
their characteristics suggests that expanding existing safety-
net programs (targeted toward the chronically poor) to mit-
igate the losses of the newly poor may not be effective or
practical. Instead, (new) interventions that address increased
levels of vulnerability and that protect households against
risk may be required.
The results also can have useful political economy impli-
cations: the substantial losses suffered by the urban middle-
income and poor households, for example, are important
because of the influence these groups can have on public
perceptions and, consequently, on policy choices. 
Notes
1. These results are consistent with the impact of the crisis
on global poverty estimated by Chen and Ravallion (2009).
2. This is not surprising, given the literature on the vul-
nerability  of  the  “middle  class.”  For  example,  Ravallion
(2009) argues that middle-income groups in developing
countries are more exposed to crisis shocks than is the rest
of the population. 
3. Each decile is equivalent to 10 percent of the country’s
population, when households are ranked in terms of per
capita income or consumption. The bottom and top deciles
are the poorest and richest 10 percent of the population, re-
spectively.
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